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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
As the global economy suffers through the 2011 Eurozone crisis, the International
Monetary Fund, also known as the Fund or the IMF, has once again been brought to the
forefront of the international stage in their attempts to fix the ever worrisome debt
problems facing Greece, Italy, Spain, and others. In the not-so-distant-past it would have
been inconceivable for a developed European economy to require assistance from the
IMF. While the IMF has, and continues to, adapt to fit the needs of countries facing
balance of payments crises, the institution’s impacts range far beyond macroeconomic
indicators. The IMF has typically spent its time fixing crises in middle and low income
countries across the globe, and in doing so has influenced their political, social and
economic elements with mixed results. Given the level of involvement with these lower
and middle income countries, it is imperative to look at how the IMF has impacted their
income inequality and poverty levels to fully determine the outcomes that their programs
and conditions have had. This paper will focus specifically on this relationship between
IMF fiscal policy conditions and income inequality in Latin America.
A Brief History of the IMF
The International Monetary Fund was originally created in 1944 during the
Bretton Woods Conference and formally established in December of 1945.1 Under the
IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the role of the IMF was to “promote international monetary
cooperation” and to “correct maladjustments in [countries’] balance of payments.”2 These

1

"About the IMF: History: Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944–71)," IMF -- International Monetary
Fund Home Page. Accessed November 26, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/about/histcoop.htm.
2
International Monetary Fund Handbook - Its Functions, Policies, and Operations, edited by Bernhand
Fritz-Krockow and Parmeshwar Ramlogan, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2007.
Accessed November 26, 2011. 1.
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statements, while still applicable today, were referring to the IMF’s role of overseeing the
operations of the newly created Bretton Woods system. Under the Bretton Woods system,
countries agreed to peg their currencies to the United States dollar, which was tied to the
value of gold. By only allowing the pegged exchange rate to be adjusted during
fundamental disequilibrium, the global monetary system would be able to avoid the
beggar-thy-neighbor policies adopted after the Great Depression, while still allowing
countries to adjust their exchange rates to avoid major balance of payments crises.3
During the 1950s and 1960s, the global economy continued to grow, and has been called
the “golden age” for the IMF, as they were credited with the success of this period.
Whether this credit was deserved is a debated topic.4 The Bretton-Woods system
continued to work well until 1971 when the United States ended the dollar’s ability to be
converted into gold. This led to the demise of the Bretton Woods System, and the
emergence of global floating exchange rates in 1973.5 After the 1973-1974 oil shock,
private banks received huge deposits from rich, oil-exporting countries, and therefore
were able to provide a significantly higher amount of private sector lending.6 Without the
Bretton Woods system to manage, and countries being able to easily borrow from private
banks, the IMF did not have a significant global role until the beginning of the 1980s and
the Third World Debt Crisis.
The Third World Debt Crisis, also referred to as the Latin America debt crisis,
was the result of a huge increase in private sector lending from the 1970s to 1982 to less
3

Graham Bird. "The IMF: A Bird's Eye View Of Its Role And Operations." Journal of Economic Surveys
21, no. 4 (2007), 686.
4
Ibid. 686.
5
"About the IMF: History: The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972–81)." IMF -- International
Monetary Fund Home Page. Accessed November 26, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm.
6
Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 687.
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developed countries (LDCs). This increase in lending was promoted by the increase in
global integration, the influx of petro dollars into the financial system, and the increased
demand for loans from developing countries.7 The total amount of debt in developing
countries increased from $180 billion in 1975 to $406 billion in 1979.8 In 1981,
international banks had already halted their flow of money into a number of countries
including Hungary, Morocco, Poland and Yugoslavia,9 However, it was not until 1982,
when Mexico “announced that its central bank had run out of foreign reserves and that it
could no longer meets payments on its foreign debt” that the situation turned into a crisis.
This was because foreign banks recognized that a number of other Latin American
countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were in similar situations to Mexico and
therefore cut all lending to those countries and demanded repayment of previous loans.10
Due to the halt in capital flows to Latin American countries and others around the world,
the crisis continued to spread until “more than 40 countries had encountered severe
external financing problems” by 1986.11 This crisis was pivotal for the role of the IMF, as
it officially became the “international crisis manager” from that point on.12
The Third World Debt crisis was followed by a series of crises throughout the
1990s and into the early 2000s. The most severe crises during this time period were the
1997 Asian Financial Crises, which this paper is outside of the scope of this papre and the
7

Manuel Pastor, and Gary A. Dymski. "Debt Crisis and Class Conflict in Latin America." Capital & Class
15, no. 1 (1991), 203-31.
8
Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith. Economic Development. Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley,
2006, 676-677.
9
James Boughton. "The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas That Have Shaped the
Institution." IDEAS: Economics and Finance Research. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/04-75.html., 12.
10
Paul R Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc J. Melitz. International Economics: Theory & Policy.
Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley, 2012, 632.
11
Ibid. 632
12
Boughton, IMF and the Force of History, 12.
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Mexican Peso Crisis in Latin America in 1994-1995. The Peso Crisis began when
Mexico devalued its peso by 15 percent in 1994, leading to a panic by investors, which
further decreased the value of the peso to 50 percent of its previous value. It wasn’t until
the IMF stepped in and provided a $17.8 billion emergency loan that the country started
to recover.13 The crises throughout Latin America during the 1980s will be further
analyzed later in this paper in the context of IMF fiscal conditions, and their
consequences for income inequality.
IMF Conditionality and Structural Adjustment Programs
The 1980s and 1990s were crucial decades for the IMF as the institution changed
to address the crises during this period. One of the most important ways in which they
changed was their usage of conditionality attached to their loans. The IMF significantly
increased the number and scope of conditions as well as started to implement structural
adjustment programs during these two decades, but have since started to reduce the
number of conditions though a streamlining process.14 Before further addressing these
new changes and structural adjustments, it is important to understand the purpose behind
conditionality.
Conditions were not originally a part of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, but
were instead added in 1952. The rationale behind their existence stems from Article 1 of
the Agreements, which states that the IMF will “give confidence to members by making
the Fund’s resource temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards.”
13

Riordan Roett. The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1996, 2 & 24.
14
Graham Bird. "Reforming IMF Conditionality - From 'streamlining' to 'major Overhaul'" World
Economics 10, no. 3 (September 2009), Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://www.relooney.info/0_New_5922.pdf., 81.
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Essentially conditions are the safeguards that will ensure every country that receives an
IMF loan will have the economic ability to repay it.15 It has also been argued that IMF
conditionality is used as a way of reducing moral hazard by increasing the costs
associated with borrowing from the IMF.16
In addition to getting repaid and reducing moral hazard, the IMF’s goal for
conditionality is to fix the problems that caused the balance of payments disequilibrium
in the first place. The IMF will only become involved with a country if there is a
demonstrated balance of payments need. This need occurs “whenever the sum total of
demands for resources in an economy exceeds the amount of those resources that can be
generated internally plus those that can be attracted from abroad.”17 If the country
demonstrates this need and approaches the IMF, it must then accept the IMF conditions,
which are defined as the “policies a member must adopt to secure access to Fund
resources.”18 There are three components to conditionality. The least demanding of these
components is the government must sign a letter of intent to receive the funds. The
second component requires the completion of prior actions before receiving the loans.
The third component is “quantified ‘performance criteria’ which are used to provide an
objective indication of whether the agreed upon programme of economy policy reform is
on track.”19 These performance criteria must be met in order for other tranches, or
additional amounts of the loan, to be given to the country.

15

Ariel Buira,.An Analysis of IMF Conditionality. University of Oxford, Economics Department, 2002, 3.
Bird, Reforming IMF Conditionality, 84.
17
Ibid. 798.
18
Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 3.
19
Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 705.
16
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In most cases, countries receiving loans from the IMF have pursued expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate the economy during a downturn. This creates an
increase in aggregate demand, and this leads to a balance of payments deficit.20 Based on
the objectives for conditionality, IMF conditions have tended to focus on reducing fiscal
imbalances and restraints on monetary expansion in order to reduce aggregate demand.21
These conditions result in policies that attempt to increase public sector revenues through
increased taxation, and limit pubic expenditures associated with wages/salaries,
government employment, subsidies, capital expenditures and state enterprises.22
According to a 1986 review by the IMF of 94 programs from 1980-1984, the totals
showed “91 percent containing measures to restrain government expenditure, and 96
percent measures to increase revenues.”23 These types of conditions were the main form
of conditionality until the structural adjustments programs were initiated in the mid1980s.
The implementation of IMF structural adjustment programs came during a period
with significant increases in the number of conditions being attached to IMF loans.24 This
increase in conditions occurred for a number of reasons including: an increase in
confidence about the correctness of economic policy recommendations, the positive
signal given to private capital markets due to a strong commitment to policy reform, and
to further decrease the potential problem of moral hazard as mentioned previously.25

20

Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 13.
Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 706.
22
Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 13.
23
Charles Sisson. "Fund-supported Programs and Income Distribution in LDCs." Finance and
Development, March 1986, 2.
24
Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 16.
25
Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 709.
21
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With the IMF determining that higher numbers of conditions was the best way of
ensuring the structural reform of countries’ economies, the IMF structural adjustment
programs were a natural fit.
These IMF structural adjustment programs were designed to “permit adjustment
to occur without there being an adverse effect on economic growth.” By allowing for
lending over a longer period of time, adjustments could be implemented gradually and
therefore still fix balance of payments problems, but without the negative impact on
growth.26 This rationale fit well with the overwhelming and complex problems in
developing countries’ economies, as well as the newly formed countries-in-transition
after the fall of the Soviet Union.27 Structural adjustment programs were also the perfect
way of incorporating the “neo-liberal economic stance and increasingly favored policies
aimed at reducing the role of the state: the reduction or elimination of subsidies, market
liberalization and privatization of public enterprises” that had been adopted by the United
States and the United Kingdom during this period.28 Therefore structural adjustment
allowed for the combination of “supply-side measures with more conventional
components of conditionality” such as reducing fiscal deficits and monetary expansion.29
This paper will later examine the effects of IMF structural adjustment programs and the
rise of conditionality on income inequality in Latin America.

26

Graham Bird, and Paul Mosley. "Should the IMF Discontinue Its Long-term Lending Role in Developing
Countries?" In Globalization and the Nation State: the Impact of the IMF and the World Bank, edited by
Gustav Ranis, James Raymond Vreeland, and Stephen Kosack. London: Routledge, 2006. Accessed
November 26, 2011. 381.
27
Bird, Reforming IMF Conditionality, 89.
28
Buira, Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 16.
29
Bird, IMF: A Bird’s Eye View, 706.
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While the rationale behind the structural adjustment programs and the rise in
conditions may have been sound, there was a lack of ownership by the countries’
governments of the programs, which led to poor results and a general lack of compliance.
With higher numbers of conditions attached to IMF loans, countries felt less compelled to
achieve them and the end result led to a 20 percent decline in compliance from the 1970s
to the 1990s.30 Both the issues of ownership and compliance are crucial when examining
what impacts IMF fiscal conditions have on income inequality.
Latin America and the Importance of Income Inequality
This paper aims to analyze the link between IMF fiscal policy conditions and its
impacts on income inequality, but first it is essential to understand why income inequality
is an important issue, and how it affects both the IMF’s goals and the overall
development of the borrowing country. According to an article in the September 2011
issue of Finance and Development, higher levels of income inequality lead to higher
levels of domestic and foreign indebtedness. This occurs because governments tend to
“prop up the living standards of the bottom group” by making it cheaper to borrow, rather
than confronting the underlying causes of the inequality.31 Increasing debt levels are
exactly what the IMF is trying to avoid, and therefore this is a compelling reason for the
IMF to address the inequality issue. Additionally, Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti
find that income inequality leads to increases in socio-political instability. This instability
decreases the levels of investment in the country, thus lowering its growth.32 These
30

Buira, Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 19.
Laurence Ball, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash Loungani. "Finance & Development, September 2011 Painful Medicine." IMF -- International Monetary Fund Home Page. September 2011. Accessed November
27, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/Ball.htm. 26.
32
Alberto Alesina, and Roberto Perotti. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment."
31
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findings are easily supported with current events around the globe, from the education
strikes in Chile to the Occupy Wall Street movement to the Arab Spring Revolutions.
Inequality is an especially important topic in Latin America. It was ranked second
in regional inequality, behind only sub-Saharan Africa in 2006 and inequality permeates
every aspect of daily life.33 Income distribution resembles a reverse pyramid, and “the
allocation of goods, services, and basic opportunities is equally unbalanced.”34 With
inequality playing major role in all economic, political and social factors in Latin
American society, it is impossible to ignore, especially given the potential consequences
this inequality may have in the future. Given the large income inequality this region has,
it is worthwhile to focus on Latin America for this paper. By analyzing the effects that
IMF fiscal conditions have had on Latin America as a region and individual countries, it
may be possible to draw conclusions about what has gone wrong, and to provide
recommendations for how the situation can be improved in the future.
This paper will analyze the effects of IMF fiscal policy conditions on income
inequality and poverty in Latin America. It will first draw upon the general literature to
provide context and insight into the relationship between IMF conditions and inequality.
The following sections will present a more in-depth analysis of Latin America and look
specifically at the case of Mexico during the 1982 Third World Debt Crisis. The final
section will address recent developments by the IMF towards improving their
conditionality to better income inequality and to provide policy recommendations.
European Economic Review 40, no. 6 (1996), 1204.
33
Edwin J. Goñi, Humberto López, and Luis Servén. "Fiscal Redistribution and Income Inequality in Latin
America." World Development 39, no. 9 (2011), 1558.
34
Kelly Hoffman, and Miguel Centeno. "The Lopsided Continent: Inequality in Latin America." Annual
Review of Sociology 29 (2003), Accessed November 26, 2011. www.jstor.org/stable/30036972. 363.
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
While the role of the International Monetary Fund has always been to help fix
balance of payment disequilibria, its impacts beyond these macroeconomic indicators
have not gone unexamined. The IMF has never been or claimed to be a development
agency, unlike the World Bank, yet the “stark reality is that there is no sharp dividing
line” between fixing a country’s balance of payments problems and helping the country
develop.35 This lack of clear distinction has prompted many to scrutinize the Fund’s
programs, especially their conditionality, and their effects on income distribution and
poverty.
This section will focus on the general literature regarding two main issues of IMF
conditionality and income inequality. The first is examining the relationship that exists
between IMF fiscal policy conditions and their impacts on income inequality and
poverty. A number of scholars working for and independently of the Fund have attempted
to empirically determine if there is an adverse effect on income distribution and the poor.
This paper will use the general literature to examine whether or not IMF fiscal conditions
have indeed hurt income inequality. While there are numerous factors (explained later in
this section) that make the analysis of this relationship extremely difficult and impossible
to measure with 100 percent accuracy, it is still valuable to examine and understand the
arguments presented. This analysis, despite its imperfections, brings crucial awareness of
issues regarding income inequality and the IMF, and provides a basis for bettering the
Fund’s conditions in the future.

35

Bird and Mosley, Should the IMF Discontinue its Long-Term Lending, 394.
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The second issue is the role of internal politics within the borrowing countries in
the development and implementation of IMF fiscal policy conditions. Countries are given
a large degree of control over the implementation of IMF conditions and those receiving
loans from the IMF have varying degrees of negotiating power based on their size and
ability to access international capital markets.36 This gives the government significant
influence over who receives the benefits of the reforms, and ultimately what
redistribution of income occurs. Therefore, it is essential to try and better understand the
role that internal politics play in the resulting changes in income inequality. This paper
will use the general literature to examine whether or not internal politics of borrowing
countries have played a significant role in adversely affecting income inequality.
By examining the general literature regarding IMF conditionality and income
inequality, there will be a greater context in which to analyze the specific cases within
Latin America. This will be especially useful when examining the role of internal politics
on income inequality, as the factors involved cannot be empirically evaluated unlike the
broad relationship between IMF fiscal conditions and income inequality. Both elements
will be reviewed more extensively in the following chapters.
IMF Fiscal Policy Conditions and Income Inequality
This section will review the general literature regarding IMF conditions and their
impact on income inequality. Through this review, it will be possible to view the major
arguments that have been presented, and draw broad conclusions about whether or not

36

Buira, Analysis of IMF Conditionality, 4.
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IMF fiscal policy conditions have indeed adversely impacted income inequality. It will
also touch on the scale of these consequences.
Before diving into the literature, it is important to understand the limitations that
are present when trying to evaluate the relationship between IMF fiscal conditions and
income inequality. Since this paper will not be examining the specific empirical
methodologies used in the literature, it is valuable to look at some of the challenges these
experts are trying to overcome during their analyses. There are two main challenges
present: 1) the problem of the counterfactual and 2) determining changes in income
inequality within a country during and after an IMF program and then attributing those
changes to IMF conditionality.
The biggest problem facing researchers is the counterfactual, or determining what
would have happened if the IMF had not given the country a loan or imposed certain
conditions.37 Essentially, there is no way of determining the exact impact of the IMF
conditions because it is impossible to know what would have happened if the IMF had
not become involved.38 That being said, it is still possible for researchers to conduct
empirical analyses on the topic, and determine meaningful results. All results must
simply be qualified by stating that due to the counterfactual issue, it is impossible to
determine if these results are 100 percent accurate.
The second challenge results from a lack of the appropriate data and imperfect
methodologies. According to Omotunde Johnson and Joanne Salop in their article
37

Graham Bird. "Growth, Poverty and the IMF." Journal of International Development 16, no. 4 (2004),
628.
38
Bird and Mosley, Should the IMF Discontinue its Long-Term Lending, 381.
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“Distributional Aspects of Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries” the ideal data
set would “provide the distribution of income both prior to and at some time after the
implementation of a program.” Unfortunately this data does not exist and therefore the
use of proxy variables is required.39 Additionally, the lack of available and reliable data
in most developing countries makes it is extremely difficult to create accurate results.40
Fortunately, data collection continues to improve and therefore future results are likely to
be more accurate than the ones examined in this paper.
Determining the appropriate methodology to attribute changes in income
inequality to the IMF conditions is also an extremely difficult task. The most intuitive
method would simply be to look at income inequality before and after the IMF program,
but this leaves the very large problem of trying to determine exactly what affect the IMF
fiscal policy conditions had rather than other factors involved. Another issue is the
timeframe used to determine the effect. Ideally the timeframe would be long enough for a
new equilibrium to be reached in the economy, thus allowing the full effects to be
present. Unfortunately this does not make practical sense and therefore imperfect
timeframes, often determined by the availability of reliable data, are used.41 Selection
bias has also posed a problem for researchers. In an ideal experiment, the subjects are
chosen at random, whereas the countries that seek IMF assistance do so because they all
have severe balance of payments disequilibria. This presents the challenge of determining
whether or not changes in income inequality are the result of the underlying factors of
39

Omotunde Johnson, and Joanne Salop. "Distributional Aspects of Stabilization Programs in Developing
Countries." Palgrave Macmillan 27, no. 1 (March 1980), Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3866860. 9.
40
Sisson, 34.
41
Fund-Supported Programs, Fiscal Policy, and Income Distribution. Vol. 46. Occasional Paper.
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1986. 2.
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these countries, or the IMF fiscal policy conditions.42 Despite these challenges, there are
a number of studies that attempt to empirically determine the link between IMF fiscal
conditions and income inequality. While none are perfect, they still provide a valuable
insight into the effects that IMF conditions have on income inequality.
Although the topic of IMF consequences on income distribution had been debated
in the past, the first significant analysis was conducted and published by the Fund in
1986. This review, Fund-Supported Programs, Fiscal Policy and Income Distribution,
concludes that “Fund-supported programs have improved rather than worsened income
distribution.”43 The report does acknowledge that their structural adjustment programs
have been controversial in regards to income inequality and poverty, but defends the IMF
policies by stating “the income distribution has not necessarily been made more
regressive as higher income groups may be affected more” and without those programs
the income disparity could have become “even more drastic.”44 The IMF also addresses
specific conditions regarding taxation, public expenditures, debt financing, subsidies and
state enterprises and finds that there is “little reason to believe that these programs lead to
any increase in income inequality… [or] any significant decrease in living standards of
the poorest quartile.”45 While these conclusions support the actions of the IMF, it is also
difficult to imagine that they would produce anything that shed a negative light on their
fairly new structural adjustment programs.

42

James Vreeland, "The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor." World Development 30, no. 1 (2002),
Accessed November 26, 2011. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.29.3746. 124.
43
Fund-Supported Programs, Fiscal Policy, and Income Distribution, 3.
44
Ibid. 4.
45
Ibid 37.
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Following the IMF’s review, an influential study was conducted by Manuel Pastor
in 1987, which reviewed 18 Latin American countries from 1965 – 1981.46 It was the
first large scale empirical analyses that attempted to determine a link between IMF
conditionality and income distribution. Pastor argues that the strongest and most
significant effects of the Fund programs were associated with the decline in wages and
the labor share of income.47 The article states that IMF programs have led to nominal
wage restraints on government workers, which have reduced the labor share of income
and furthered the redistribution away from workers.48 The article also makes the claims
that IMF conditions that force the decrease in government expenditures hurt the non-elite
the most, and this exacerbation in class conflict and income distribution can lead to
extreme social tensions and political conflict.49 While these particular claims are largely
unsubstantiated in his article, they pose the interesting question of the role that the elites
and internal politics play in redistribution. This topic will be covered in further depth
later in this chapter.
In 2000, Gopal Garuda conducted another, more empirically sound, study
focusing on 58 IMF programs from 1975-1991.50 The paper examines the effects of
“currency devaluation, reductions in the budget deficit, changes in growth rates and
changes in inflation rates” on income inequality through analyzing countries’ GINI

46

Manuel Pastor. "The Effects of IMF Programs in the Third World: Debate and Evidence from Latin
America." IDEAS: Economics and Finance Research. 1987. Accessed November 27, 2011.
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v15y1987i2p249-262.html. 249.
47
Ibid. 249.
48
Ibid 258.
49
Ibid 259.
50
Gopal Garuda. "The Distributional Effects of IMF Programs: A Cross-Country Analysis." World
Development 28, no. 6 (2000), 1031.
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coefficients.51 The results show that countries with severe balance of payments problems
that receive IMF loans “show 10-20 percentage point declines in distribution measures
relative to control group countries.”52 This increase in income inequality often results
from aggregate demand reducing policies, which include “cuts in government
expenditure, increases in levels of taxation, reductions in real wages, and credit
restraints.” These policies prompt nominal wage cuts and reductions in public sector
employment, which tend to “increase poverty and worsen the skew of income.”53 This
paper further emphasizes the role that fiscal policy changes determined by IMF loan
conditions play in income inequality and poverty.
James Vreeland’s 2001 paper, “The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor”, uses
2,095 observations of 110 countries from 1961-1993 to analyze the role of IMF programs
on labor’s share of income in the manufacturing sector.54 Vreeland finds that “when
countries enter IMF programs, labor share plummets and as participation continues it
seems to trend downward.”55 This decrease in labor share in due to IMF conditions for a
reduction in public expenditure. This occurs though “wage freezes, limits on
employment, and reduced benefits for public employees.”56 Vreeland’s findings reinforce
the previous findings of Garuda and Pastor but then delve further into why this income
inequality occurs. The paper demonstrates that not only does labor’s share of income
decrease but capital’s share of income increases.57 This is significant because the owners

51

Ibid. 1033.
Ibid. 1047.
53
Ibid. 1033-1034.
54
Vreeland, The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor, 121.
55
Ibid. 127.
56
Vreeland, the Effect of IMF Programs on Labor, 122.
57
Ibid. 133.
52
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of capital (who tend to be better off in the first place) are therefore hurt less by IMF
conditions than their labor force thus widening the income gap in both directions.
Vreeland definitively concludes by stating “IMF programs have negative distributional
consequences”58, and “the negative effects of IMF programs on economic growth are
paid for by the least well-off in a country.”59
While there has been significant evidence demonstrating that IMF fiscal policy
conditions have indeed had negative income distribution effects, these consequences are
still debated, and their entirety is not fully known or understood. In Graham Bird’s article
“Growth, Poverty and the IMF,” he claims that countries that have pursued IMF
structural adjustment programs have a “more ‘pro-poor’ mix of stabilization polices...
[and] government expenditure on health and education seems to be more protected and
regressive tax policies less likely.” These factors result in a moderation of income
inequality.60 William Easterly has concluded that the main result from IMF conditions is
that they lower the “growth elasticity of poverty.” This means the poor will benefit less
from economic growth under structural adjustment, but they will not be hurt as badly
during a period of recession.61 Omotunde Johnson and Joanne Salop conclude that “the
brunt of any downward adjustment of government expenditure to GDP is most commonly
borne by public sector employees engaged in projects that come to be postponed.”62

58

Ibid. 133.
James Raymond Vreeland. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003. 151.
60
Graham Bird. "Growth, Poverty and the IMF." Journal of International Development 16, no. 4 (2004),
629.
61
William Easterly. "The Effect of IMF and World Bank Programs on Poverty." October 31, 2000.
Accessed November 26, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-00/e.pdf. 2.
62
Johnson and Salop, 12.
59
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These mix of views and findings fuel the debate over the actual consequences that
IMF conditions may have on income inequality. With the methodological and data
problems associated with such large scale analyses presented above, it is extremely
difficult to draw any firm general conclusions. Additionally, Heller et al. observe that
without a more disaggregated analysis, it is almost impossible to truly understand the
consequences on income inequality. They use the example of cutting funding in the
education sector. If the cuts are at the university level or for primary education, the
distributional impacts will be very different. Similarly, it is important to not only view the
amount of cuts, but to “assess the impact on the quality and quantity of services
delivered.”63 Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding of the IMF fiscal policy
conditions it is necessary to take a more specific approach and analyze the specific
outcomes at a regional and country specific level. The following chapters will attempt to
do this for Latin America, and then Mexico specifically.
Internal Politics and Fiscal Policy Implementation
While a conclusive answer has yet to be provided over the consequences of IMF
fiscal policy conditions on income inequality, it is essential to analyze and understand the
role that the government of the borrowing country plays when determining how the fiscal
policy is actually implemented. The IMF imposes fiscal policy conditions on the
borrowing country, but these conditions rarely have specific actions that countries must
take. In fact, only 3 of 94 programs from 1980-1984 have an “explicit reference to a
government functional expenditure and less than one third of the programs refers to
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government functional expenditure policies at all.”64 The IMF is able to encourage fiscal
reform without specifically referring to fiscal policies by “placing limitations on credit to
the government and the acquisition of new foreign debt.”65 This forces the government to
fix their fiscal deficit in order to maintain financial viability. The IMF also allows the
government to determine how it is going to fix its fiscal deficit because it is extremely
difficult for them to determine how much spending is too much in any given sector.66 The
borrowing government therefore has to cut spending or raise revenues, but is allowed to
determine how this takes place. It is critical to analyze what role internal politics and the
favoritism of the elite plays in the government’s decisions, and whether those decisions
adversely affect income inequality and the poor.
The general literature demonstrates that the government’s decisions do play a
very important role in determining the consequences on the country’s income inequality.
Sidney Dell points out that the “causes of distributional outcomes ‘lie more in the realm
of politics than economics.’”67 Domestic political decisions “largely determine who bears
the burden of reducing and restructuring aggregate demand.”68 The government has the
ability to determine the “composition of the budget cuts,” and the resulting income
inequality will depend on that composition.69 The most direct manner in which this
composition could significantly hurt the poor and increase income inequality is by cutting
social programs that target the poor.70 This allocation also plays a significant role when
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determining which public sector jobs are going to be cut. Income distribution will
become more equal if high paid upper level government employees are cut, whereas if
only low level government jobs are cut income inequality will become worse.71
Therefore, the government plays a crucial role in determining who is affected by the
fiscal changes prompted by IMF conditions.
Given this link between government decisions and income inequality outcomes, it
is important to understand how and why governments make the decisions that they do
regarding their changes in fiscal policy. The main argument posed by numerous scholars
is that governments make their decisions based on ensuring the continued support of the
local elite. One reason for this is that in order for a country to reach an agreement with
the IMF, it must get the support of these elite and this is often achieved by promising
them they will not bear the costs of the adjustments.72 Due to the IMF's desire to “secure
the cooperation of local elites [it] may lead them to design programs which place the
burden of adjustment on workers and other ‘popular classes.’”73 Therefore, the
governmental authorities do not have complete control over the fiscal policies they
ultimately implement. Instead, “the choice of policy instruments will be influenced by the
political power of various income groups.”74 The likely result will be that the government
will cut basic social services and the “’social wage’ will decline further and distributional
consequences will be worse.”75 While the government does also take into account the
“causes of the balance of payments problem and of the effects of different policy
71
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instruments” into its decisions, the influences of the elite often ensure that they remain
relatively unhurt by the policy outcomes.76
Although the IMF officially maintains that income distribution outcomes are an
“internal political concern,” they have always been indirectly concerned with how their
programs affect income inequality and resource allocation issues. This is partly due to the
fact that the complexity of the topic makes it challenging for the IMF to address.77 It is
extremely difficult to empirically evaluate the true effect of IMF conditions on income
inequality due to poor access to information, and the problem of the counterfactual.
However, the general literature has generally found that the impacts of IMF conditions on
the fiscal policies of borrowing countries can have direct negative consequences on
income inequality and poverty within the country involved. While IMF conditionality is
often blamed for these adverse effects, the governments of borrowing countries also play
a significant role in determining the changes in income inequality. This often occurs
when the government implements IMF programs to protect certain groups of
constituencies, which have “disproportionately served the interests of the middle- and
upper-income groups rather than the poor.”7879 The general literature provides a basic
understanding of the problems associated with the IMF, internal politics and income
equality, but does not fully explain the intricacies of these relationships. The following
chapters will attempt to accomplish this in the context of Latin America.
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMF, LATIN AMERICA, AND INCOME INEQUALITY
The IMF has been actively lending across the globe since its founding, but its
involvement in Latin America was vastly increased after the 1982 Latin America Debt
Crisis. To illustrate this point, in 1983 almost three quarters of Latin American countries
were under IMF programs, compared with less than one-third in the 1970s.80 This was
not only a momentous change between the IMF and the region, but for the IMF itself.
Before the crisis, the IMF had mainly only lent to small low-income countries in Africa
and East Asia. The 1982 crisis not only allowed the Fund to diversify its portfolio of
countries, but solidify its role in the international community as a crisis managing
institution.81 Given the significance of the Latin American crisis, for both the continent
and the IMF, it is valuable to examine the causes leading to the crisis, the response by the
IMF, and the resulting outcomes on income inequality and poverty in the region. This
section will also analyze the role of national politics and various interest groups in
determining the successes and failures of the implementation of IMF fiscal conditionality.
The Latin American debt crisis emerged from the huge boom in international
lending that occurred during the period of 1974-1979. With the recycling of OPEC petrol
dollars following a price spike in 1973, Latin American countries continued to use cheap
capital to fund their growth, becoming further indebted, and eventually leading to the
crisis in August 1982 when Mexico announced it could no longer pay its debts.82 While
this is the broad story behind the crisis, there are a number of other factors that spurred
this increase in borrowing in addition to the fact that the money was easily available.
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Pastor and Dyrnski state that financial internationalization and the slow growth of
advanced economies were substantial contributing factors.83 As the growth in developed
countries started to decline, this reduced the amount of imports they were willing to
purchase, and Latin America suffered the most as a consequence of these changes.84
Additionally, Krugman et al. point to the U.S. dollar’s significant appreciation after 1981,
which “raised the real value of the dollar debt burden substantially.”85 This only
exacerbated the already high levels of debt the Latin American countries had been
obtaining.
These numerous external factors clearly influenced the excessive borrowing in
Latin America, but it does not fully explain the rationale for the Latin American countries
themselves. Berg and Sachs argue that the large amount of borrowing was the not the
result of strategic economic calculations but “the political needs of the incumbent
government” as a way to “satisfy intense social demands for higher government spending
without having to suffer (in the short-term) the political consequences of higher tax”
rates.86 This rationale makes logical sense, and is consistent with almost every other large
fiscal deficit in the world. The government wants to gain social favor by providing
additional services, but does not want to pay for them. However, Berg and Sachs delve
further into why Latin American countries specifically had such high debt levels. They
suggest that the prevalence of extreme income inequality in Latin America lead to “little
commonality of interests” and a conflict between higher pressure for redistributive
83
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policies and the wealthy class’ ability to resist these pressures given their more influential
position in society.87 Therefore, the internal demand for government spending caused by
income inequality coupled with the large prevalence of international funding and the
harmful economic shifts from the United States and other developed countries all
contributed to the 1982 Latin American Debt Crisis. Now that the underlying factors
behind the crisis have been addressed, it is possible to examine the policy responses by
the IMF and the Latin American countries, and the outcomes of those decisions on
income inequality and poverty.
IMF Conditionality and Latin American Structural Adjustments
In the years following the Latin American Debt Crisis, the IMF increased the
number of conditions attached to their Standby arrangements and Extended Fund Facility
(EFF) loans from approximately “six in the 1970s to 10 in the 1980s.”88 While these IMF
loans were designed to fix balance of payments problems, they did not address growth.
The term “stabilization” or “stabilization program” is often used for these short term
policy changes to fix a balance of payments deficit.89 This eventually led to the
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in 1986 and 1987 respectively. The SAF and ESAF were
designed to promote growth through three year longer term structural adjustments in
addition to fixing the immediate balance of payments problems faced by the countries.90
In the case of Latin America, poorer countries such as Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua
87
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utilized the SAF/ESAF loans, whereas the middle income countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico only used the Standby and EFF loans. With the IMF doing its
best to adapt to the needs of its member countries, there were still a number of problems
that faced Latin American countries during this period.
One of the biggest problems that countries in Latin America were facing when
approaching the IMF for assistance was their huge fiscal deficits caused by the excessive
debt built up during the 1970s. Therefore, one of the main focuses of IMF conditions was
on fixing these fiscal deficits. Critics, such as Pastor, disagree with the “excessive
attention to fiscal measures” stating that “a deliberate attempt to reduce fiscal deficits in
the midst of [a] global slowdown is a reckless pro-cyclical policy.”91 While the criticism
may be valid, there are limited alternative options for countries to take to fully address
their growing debt levels and fiscal deficits.
There are two ways to fix a fiscal deficit: increase government revenues through
increased taxation, or decrease government expenditures. Ideally the government would
be able to increase tax revenues by increasing rates of existing taxes and/or widening the
base of existing taxes. However, in most countries tax rates were already quite high and
broadening existing taxes was not a viable option. A more viable option was to introduce
a new and broadly based tax, often in the form of a value-added tax (VAT).92 Bolivia
introduced a successful VAT tax during its 1985 restructuring, and it “quickly became the
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centerpiece of the new tax system.”93 Chile was also able to successfully implement a
VAT tax, which increased its tax revenue by five percent of GDP.94
Unfortunately successful taxation is not always the case. Increasing revenue in
developing countries is extremely difficult due to the inadequacy of the necessary
enforcement agencies to enact these changes. Heymann described the Argentine tax
system as “that of a system without clear design, with complicated legislation that is not
enforced, which cannot collect broad-based taxes and has to rely on a diversity of rather
primitive taxes.”95 This is why the simplification of the tax code was so essential to the
success of countries like Bolivia. By replacing the old and ineffective tax system and
replacing it with more streamlined taxes, Bolivia was actually able to succeed at
increasing its revenues.96 This results in the majority of changes occurring on the
expenditure side.
Given the difficulties associated with collecting government revenues, the
majority of fiscal reforms took place by decreasing government expenditures. The IMF
Conditionality Guidelines implies that the IMF should “interfere as little as possible with
the preferences of the borrower.”97 This has generally allowed the borrowing
governments to determine how to specifically implement these budget cuts, leaving the
IMF to only provide external advice. Cuts in fiscal spending tend to fall under four main
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categories: government wage/employment levels, subsidies, state enterprises and capital
expenditures.98 All four of these options provide the government with viable and
effective means of cutting costs in the short run and for the long term benefit of the
country if they are used appropriately.
The most used type of fiscal reductions involved reducing minimum wages,
government employee salaries, and/or decreasing the number of government employees.
This sector is an easy target for spending reductions given that on average more than 40
percent of non-agricultural workers are employed by the government, and the
government is the one that determines those salaries.99 For example, in 1990 Argentina
announced that there would be a freeze on new hiring, anyone above the retirement age
would be forced to leave, and they would eliminate 56 secretary of state positions.100
These types of cuts, in addition to temporary wage and hiring freezes were common but
were often ineffective. This was partly because they made government jobs unappealing,
and therefore made it difficult to hire the talented senior level officials necessary for the
positions.101 Additionally, repeated attempts at wage freezes that occurred in Brazil and
Argentina “encouraged private sector firms to increase prices preemptively” so as to
mitigate the effects.102 Wage and hiring freezes were also largely unsuccessful due to the
obvious political implications involved. In Bolivia, “politically powerful groups, such as
the armed forces and workers in the education and health sectors” influenced government
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decisions resulting in a negligible reduction in government employment.103 Therefore,
while temporary wage and hiring freezes were common in Latin America, they did not
have significant long term impacts on the fiscal budgets.
The reduction or elimination of government subsidies was another tool that
governments used to try to fix their fiscal deficits. Subsidies, usually on food, petroleum
or fertilizers, were used to keep prices low for the people, and were often touted as
protecting the lower class.104 Under Fujimori, Peru eliminated a number of its subsidies
in 1990 in an attempt to balance its budget.105 Brazil also reduced its subsidies of food
and oil during this time. Historically, there has been a large debate about whether or not
the reduction and elimination of subsidies disproportionately hurt the poor. While Sisson
argues that the majority of subsidy benefits ultimately help the rich instead of the poor,
subsidies still do have some benefit for the poor even if it is not as much as it should
be.106
A third category of budget cuts regards government capital expenditures. Capital
expenditures, also referred to as public investment, are normally spent on bigger projects
like infrastructure, hospitals, etc. and therefore take a longer time to complete and are
more expensive. Government capital expenditures also include “repair, maintenance, and
other recurrent costs in order to attain greater efficiency in utilizing the existing capital
stock, rather than creating new capital.”107 While some programs, such as those in Chile,
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managed to increase the amount of public investment, the majority of countries in Latin
America used capital expenditures as a short term means of cutting costs.108 For example
in 1985, Bolivia enacted a one year halt on public investment, and Argentina during its
IMF program in 1989 “announced a suspension of all state-funded public works.”109
Cutting capital expenditure generally has low political costs, especially when
governments reduce maintenance funding. Short term cuts on capital expenditures can
also be the most damaging in the long-run for both the growth of the country, and the
impacts on income inequality.
Challenges to Fiscal Policy Reform
Fiscal policy reforms face a significant variety of challenges, and are often never
fully accomplished. Vito Tanzi elaborates on the extent of fiscal policy challenges by
stating “tax evasion, inflation, and the proliferation of exonerations have reduced the
government’s control of tax revenues, while political pressures, fragmentation of the
public sector, and inadequate monitoring systems have undermined its ability to keep
public expenditure in check.”110 Additionally, the fiscal policies changes that are
ultimately implemented are not always the most economically beneficial, and thus do not
always accomplish their goals of fixing the balance of payments problems and spurring
growth in the country. This section will focus on the challenges that have faced fiscal
policy reform in Latin America. It will also emphasize the political factors that can and
have influenced these policy decisions.
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Fiscal policy reforms have not had the success that IMF programs would suggest
they should. This is often due to the fact that the specific allocation of fiscal policy cuts is
not done in the most economically beneficial manner. This refers specifically to the rate
of return on various government expenditures, and their effects on growth. If the
government cuts programs that are beneficial to long-term and sustainable growth, such
as capital expenditure, then it can hurt the economy in the medium and long term despite
the initial decrease in the fiscal deficit.111 Interestingly, the IMF’s Independent
Evaluation Office (IEO) has shown that the implementation of an “IMF-supported
program does not reduce public spending in either health or education—measured as a
share of total public spending, GDP, or in per capita real terms.”112 This is one example
of governments choosing the right programs to keep. The ideal composition of budget
cuts would be to eliminate the wasteful and inefficient programs of the public sector, and
leave the efficient and beneficial programs untouched.
While this composition would be ideal, it is highly unlikely that this will actually
occur due to national politics and the vested interested of various groups that would be
adversely affected in some way. All IMF programs, especially those referring to fiscal
reform in Latin America, “do in fact serve the interest of the ruling groups” and other
interest groups.113 A main factor behind the implemented fiscal policies that makes them
different from the most economically sound options is the government’s general
preference for short-sighted thinking rather than long-term planning. Governments have
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short time horizons and short sighted thinking for a number of reasons, but especially
because of their desire to maintain power. This occurred in Venezuela during the 1980s
as their policy reforms reflected no strategy for redirecting spending other than making
cuts in areas that were the easiest to achieve.114 One cost of pursuing stabilization policies
is that the “short-run political costs [begin] to loom larger than the longer-run economic
benefits” and political support for the program therefore declines.115 The austerity
measures associated with fiscal policy reform can often be painful politically, and
therefore the government generally chooses to pursue the reforms that have the most
support from various interest groups. This ultimately leads to reforms that are not
beneficial in the long run, but rather politically feasible in the short run.
Internal politics also plays a large role in determining whether or not a country
will comply with adjustment benchmarks set by the IMF, regardless of the fact that these
benchmarks are often requirements for the country to continue receiving its loan.
Hutchinson and Noi find that Latin America had significantly higher rates of recidivism,
or repeated loans with the IMF, than other regions.116 Buira also notes that IMF
conditionality compliance declines in a parallel manner with the increase in the number
of loan conditions.117 The intuitive argument that with more conditions there will likely
be more instances of incompliance stands true in this case. This high recidivism rate is
also partially explained by the fact that as soon as an arrangement starts to “break down,
the Fund immediately starts to negotiate a new program” and this previous lack of
114
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compliance does not affect receiving new loans in the future.118 Given the lack of
incentives for countries to meet the fiscal policy conditionality they agreed upon in order
to receive the loan, governments choose to do what is in their best interests and often
times it is the policymaker’s optimal policy choice to not push for the completion of these
fiscal reforms.119 Without consequences in place, governments in Latin America have
chosen to ignore their initial agreements with the IMF, and thus benefit politically from
the softened fiscal policy impacts on the country.
Income Inequality and Latin America
During stabilization policies and structural adjustments, countries in Latin
America have neglected to address the effects that fiscal policies have on income
inequality and the poor. As long as politicians maintain their support base, and the IMF is
satisfied with their progress addressing their balance of payments problems, there is no
reason to examine if the policy decisions may be ignoring the underlying expansion of
“income distribution [and] exacerbated social tension.”120 In fact, governments are more
than happy to enact policies that “create ‘rents’ for groups whose support the government
need in order to stay in power” and completely ignore the future consequences on both
the economy and income inequality in the future.121 It is important to note however that
not all effects on income inequality should be attributed to IMF conditions and
government implementation. Given the level of debt, and the severity of the crisis during
the 1980s, Killick argues that “declines in real wages and consumption standards, and
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increased proportions living in poverty…became inevitable.”122 While this may certainly
be the case, it is highly likely that government policies exacerbated income inequality in
Latin America.
Latin America suffered in the 1980s especially, with regional decline of 6.6
percent in GDP per capita and a 16 percent decline in income per capita.123 While this
decline impacted everyone, the poor were affected more than the wealthy. From 19801985, the consumption per capita of the owners of capital rose by 16 percent whereas the
consumption of labor declined by 25 percent.124 This demonstrates how despite the
overall decline in growth in Latin America, the brunt of this decline was felt by the poor.
An example of the rising inequality is Brazil, where the “ratio of the top 10 percent to
the bottom 40 percent rose from 5.1 in 1980 to 6.7 in 1990, with a similar increase based
on per-capita household income.”125 This rise in income inequality was mirrored
throughout the region.
After the Latin American Debt Crisis, the IMF tried to help countries fix their
massive debts by imposing conditions that would force them to reduce their fiscal
deficits. These conditions generally gave countries the freedom to determine how they
were actually going to implement these policies. Fiscal reform typically took place by
increasing tax revenue through new broadly based taxes, and decreasing expenditures by
reducing government salaries and employment, reducing subsidies, and cutting capital
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expenditures. While fiscal adjustments were absolutely necessary for the countries to fix
their high levels of foreign debt, the policy choices made were often short sighted and
were determined based on their effects on political support, rather than long-term
economic stability and growth. These decisions often resulted in countries not meeting
the benchmarks set by the IMF, which should have resulted in the termination of the loan.
However, this would ultimately never occur since the IMF would always renegotiate with
those countries. This furthered the political motivations to avoid politically costly actions
during stabilization reforms and policies. By avoiding the most economically and socially
beneficial fiscal reforms, Latin American governments ultimately hurt income inequality
and the poor.
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CHAPTER 4: THE IMF AND MEXICO: 1980-1989
While analyzing Latin America as a whole brings the major issues regarding the
IMF and income inequality to light, it is impossible to delve into the complexities and
important details that occur during the process of negotiating loan conditions and the
decisions behind how the borrowing country determines which fiscal policies to adapt
after finally receiving the IMF loan. By focusing on the specific case of Mexico before,
during, and after the 1982 crisis, it will be easier to understand these intricacies and gain
a better insight into the rationale behind IMF and the Mexican governmental decisions,
and how they ultimately impacted income inequality and the poor.
The 1982 crisis was a pivotal moment for the IMF and the global financial
community in general. With Mexico’s announcement that it would not be able to pay its
debts, the world faced its first serious threat of a global financial collapse. The IMF
stepped in to help manage the crisis but this was essentially new territory for them as they
had to balance the internal politics of Mexico, the interests of the United States, and
foreign bank demands for repayment, all while trying to implement a loan package that
would satisfy all parties involved before Mexico defaulted on its loans. This was an
incredibly complicated task, and one that will be examined further in this chapter.
The implementation of the IMF’s conditions regarding fiscal reductions was also
a complicated process. Internal politics, especially with the election of a new president,
and an uncooperative private sector led to a lack of political will to fully implement
painful fiscal cuts necessary to get the country out of the crisis. Instead, a large fiscal
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reduction occurred, but not large enough to actually make the country’s economy grow
again. This ultimately led to an increase in income inequality and poverty in the country.
Mexico is an interesting case study to examine the relationship between IMF
conditions and income inequality due to the fact that the program negotiated was “one of
the most severe austerity packages launched in Latin America during that period.”126
Given that the 1982 crisis was the first real crisis to “threaten the stability of the [entire]
international financial system” it was also one of the most urgent programs the IMF had
ever undertaken.127 With high stakes and little time, the IMF loan to Mexico “introduced
important innovations in the speed of negotiations, the role of structural elements in the
policy adjustment program, the assembling of official financing packages, and…relations
between the Fund and private creditors.”128 Mexico provides an excellent example of
how the urgency in the face of a crisis and role of internal politics are highly influential in
determining the number and depth of conditions attached to IMF loans. This example
demonstrates how these factors determine whether or not the country ultimately follows
through to meet those conditions, and what consequences they have on income inequality
and poverty.
Negotiating IMF Program Conditionality
Nobody in either the IMF or the Mexican government had predicted that there
was an imminent crisis in the early 1980s. IMF economists had expressed concerns about
the rising levels of debt but the country’s booming oil industry mitigated these
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concerns.129 Once the possibility of economic troubles became more apparent towards the
middle of 1981, Mexico’s external public debt was already at a record high of $52.2
billion USD, almost double its $26.4 billion debt in 1978.130 The initially high level of
debt stemmed from the rise of populism in the country during the 1970s, which
“accelerated public investment [and] increased social spending” and continued due to a
lack of political will to increase taxes or reduce government spending.131 An additional
$20 billion dollars in debt was added in the second half of 1981 and the first half of 1982
in order to pay off the interest on its high level of debt.132 While the rapid rise in
borrowing was concerning, the more important problem was the borrowing was only
short term, and therefore a significant amount of the principal debt had to be paid back by
1983. During this same 1978-1991 period, the operational deficit had also risen from 5.7
percent of GDP to 9.8 percent.133
The situation became even more concerning due to the fact that there was an
upcoming presidential election in July 1982, and it would be extremely difficult to pass
any tough changes until the new president was in office.134 Unfortunately the winner of
this presidential election, Miguel de la Madrid, was not able to take office until
December, despite the financial worries of the country.135 The IMF believed that the
country would be able to avoid default until that time, but in mid-August “new money
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dried up, and Mexico faced a crisis that could be resolved only through international
coordination.”136
Mexico desperately needed external funding to avoid a default, which would have
been a catastrophe to their economy, the economy of the United States, and the entire
global financial structure. Therefore, the IMF took the lead in trying to work out a loan
program for Mexico with the utmost urgency. After some initial negotiations, the IMF’s
Managing Director told the Mexican representatives that the “program would have to be
designed by the Mexican authorities themselves and would have to meet their own
political as well as economic requirements.” This was going to be particularly difficult
because the program “would have to be endorsed by both the outgoing and the incoming
administrations” in addition to the other parties involved.137 The private banks that had
been lending to Mexico were one of these important parties. The IMF determined that
without their support and an additional flow of capital, Mexico would surely default,
hurting everyone. It was therefore in the bank’s best interests to increase their lending to
Mexico.138
After months of negotiations, the IMF and Mexico eventually reached an
agreement on December 23, 1982 for $3.75 billion USD under the EFF extended
arrangement facility. In addition to this, commercial banks had committed $4.3 billion in
additional capital.139 The most pressing condition of the program was Mexico’s reduction
in its fiscal deficit. The Mexican government agreed to reduce the fiscal deficit to 8.5
136
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percent of GDP in 1983, from 16.5 percent in 1982.140 This was a huge reduction, and
absolutely necessary in order to begin fixing the country’s debt crisis and regain growth
after a negative 0.5 percent decline in GDP in 1982.141 After taking office Miguel De la
Madrid also promoted “trade liberalization and privatization” as additional government
objectives to improve the economy.142 These actions shifted the country away from the
previous conflict between the populist governments and the domestic business elite and
the “orthodox technical specialists in the Central Bank and Treasury.”143 De la Madrid’s
background as one of these technical specialists allowed him to surround himself with
people who “shared his views of fiscal conservatism” and therefore reduce the power of
public enterprises and “reduce the allocation of subsidies to public firms.”144 While these
were more long term strategies, the biggest and most energy consuming emphasis right
after the crisis was on the reduction of the huge fiscal deficit in order to satisfy the IMF
and help return growth to the country.
Mexico’s Fiscal Reductions and Income Inequality
The extremely large decrease in the Mexican government’s fiscal deficit was
inevitably going to hurt the poor and increase income inequality. Given that the IMF loan
negotiations required only the support of the Mexican political and economic elite, and
not the popular vote, it was highly likely that fiscal deficit reductions would increase
income inequality in the following years. It is also worthwhile to note that Mexico was
not a very wealthy country before this crisis hit. Despite its long period of economic
140
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growth, “between 35 and 40% of household earned a total income below the prevailing
minimum wage, approximately 19 million people suffered from malnutrition; the infant
mortality rate was equal to 50 per 1,000 live births; and around 15% of the population
was illiterate.145 Therefore, the effects of the 1982 crisis on poverty and inequality only
heightened the existing levels that were present. This section will review the different
elements of Mexico’s fiscal reduction and their consequences on income inequality and
poverty.
In order to decrease the fiscal deficit, the IMF had imposed conditions including
“a new devaluation, increase in public revenues – via increase in indirect taxes as well as
in the prices of public services – and highly restrictive credit and wage policies.”146 This
led to a decline of 6.3 percent in GDP per capita in 1983, but did manage to reduce the
public fiscal deficit by half.147 Over the period of 1982 – 1985, “GDP grew at an average
of zero %; real wages were reduced by 30%; the wage share contracted by 10%; and
social expenditures fell on average by 19%.”148 With a lack of new lending, “declining
reserves, a plunge in oil prices, and a major new surge in inflation,” Mexico’s economy
had not improved but had instead plunged back into recession by 1985.149 Therefore,
while the austerity measures may have reduced the fiscal deficit, they did not fix the
problem, but rather made income inequality worse in the country instead.
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In an attempt to increase government revenues, the Mexican government
introduced a number of new taxes after the IMF loan. While these efforts were beneficial,
especially those regarding the implementation a reformed VAT tax, they did not create a
sizeable change for the government.150 This was most likely due to a significant amount
of tax fraud and a narrow a tax base.151 While continuing to improve the tax system,
especially in the enforcement and collection areas, would have been extremely beneficial,
it was not politically feasible. Often times “Mexican private sector groups…used the
threat of capital flight to veto government tax reform initiatives,” forcing the country to
have “one of the lightest tax loads in the region.”152 Instead, the country focused more on
revenue collection through higher prices for public goods and reductions in government
expenditures. By increasing the prices for public goods and services, Mexico was able to
increase its revenues to offset the decline in revenue from their lagging oil industry.153
The most important components behind the fiscal reductions were the
employment levels and the changes in wage income within Mexico. Real average wages
decrease by 26.5 percent in 1983 and real minimum wages declined by 25.2 percent.154
These decreases were the most severe of the three year IMF program. That being said, by
1985 real wages had contracted by approximately 30 percent overall.155
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income that were made during the year of Mexico’s oil boom.”156 The Mexican
government was able to decrease nominal minimum wages by pegging them to expected
inflation, which was lower than actual inflation for that year. This meant that minimum
wages were much lower than they had been in the past, which hurt the lower classes that
would be working minimum wage jobs the most.
Employment also declined significantly in the manufacturing and construction
activities “which together comprise about 20% of total employment and 27% of
nonagricultural employment.”157 Due to government cuts in capital expenditures, a
decrease in construction employment and wages was the natural consequences as nothing
new was being built. These reductions could have also been supplemented by a more
aggressive strategy towards eliminating excess government positions.158 However, this
did not occur because it would potentially threaten influential political leaders. While the
overall unemployment rate did not plunge as drastically as it could have during such a
large recession, the lower income population was still substantially hurt by the reductions
in employment and the decreasing wage levels across every sector.
The reduction of social expenditures was another of the main components of the
stabilization plan that had significant consequences for income inequality. With a decline
in revenues due to lower oil prices, and 40 percent of public expenditure going to debt
servicing (15 percent increase from 1980-1981 levels), it was inevitable that the
government would have to cut its expenditures on services such as health, education,
156
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social security, and others.159 From 1980-1981, Mexico spent a total of 17 percent of
public expenditures on social expenditures, which then dropped to 12.7 percent from
1983-1985. This amounted to a decrease in per capita outlays of 24 percent for education,
22 percent for health, and 37 percent for social security in comparison with the 1982
levels.160
While the quantity of services did not decline during this period, it is highly likely
that teachers and doctors received significantly lower salaries. This could lead to lower
human capital in these areas, and thus eventually a lower quality of service. Additionally,
a decrease in capital expenditures “means not only that new capacity was not generated,
but also that existing capacity was not properly maintained.”161 Therefore, while the level
of services did not decline during this period, the social expenditure cuts most likely led
to worse quality public services in the following years. It is possible that the reduction of
capital expenditures associated with social programs was simply cutting programs with
low social rates of return, but given the extent of the decreases, this is unlikely to have
occurred for all of the reductions.162
Mexico also greatly reduced its subsidies in order to decrease its expenditures to
help fix the fiscal deficit. Subsidies for basic foodstuffs and public transportation
declined from 6.5 percent in 1982 to 2.1 in 1987 as a percent of GNP.163 This occurred as
the result of the push for the privatization of many state industries as a way of reducing
governmental expenditures. By reducing subsidized prices and transfers to state
159
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enterprises, they would make more revenue, cost less, and would be more prepared to be
taken over by the private sector.164 In addition to the push for privatization, the
government also used a reduction in subsidies as a way of cutting costs. The Mexican
government decided to implement more targeted subsidies rather than having a general
food subsidy. This mainly resulted in the elimination of the general subsidies for corn
tortillas, “the staple of the popular diet.” Instead, a two tiered pricing system was set up.
Additional subsidies on “cooking oil, bread, and eggs were also gradually eliminated.165
While the leakage associated with these subsidies is not known, it is reasonable to assume
that the majority of the people helped by these food subsidies are lower income. By
eliminating these food subsidies, “the cost of the basic food basket [as a percentage of
their minimum wage] rose from 30% in 1982 to over 50% in 1985”.166 This is an
extremely large increase for basic food necessities, and therefore the reductions of the
subsidies, while most likely necessary to reduce the fiscal deficit, had significant
consequences on the income and health of the poor. These factors clearly contributed to
the increase in income inequality in Mexico.
The poor and middle classes as well as small and private entrepreneurs “bore the
brunt of both stabilization and structural adjustment. The 50 percent drop in real wages
from 1982-1988, rising unemployment and a 70 percent cut on popular consumption
subsidies during the first three years led to a very socially discontent country.167
However, despite these changes the Mexican people did not violently demonstrate against
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the government. Instead, the majority of the people dedicated more hours to working and
creating more diversified sources of income. Rather than lashing out against the
government in frustration, there was a general “’retreat to the household’” and a focus on
finding ways to cope with the economic downturn.168 This was not the case in the
Dominican Republic, where riots after IMF imposed price increases “left 60 dead, 200
wounded, and 4,300 arrested.”169 Therefore, these opposing reactions show how volatile
economic reforms can potentially be, and events could have gotten a lot worse in Mexico
if there had also been as significant a civil unrest. This attitude definitely maintained the
stability of the country, but most likely hurt income inequality by allowing the
government and interest groups to determine their fate without standing up for their rights
and wages.
While the country managed to decrease its fiscal deficit leading after receiving the
IMF loan, these fiscal reductions inevitably led to an increase in income inequality and
poverty in the country. Essentially Mexico conducted a meaningful reform right after the
1982 crisis, but after 1983 “fiscal and monetary policies were eased significantly” due to
the upcoming midterm presidential elections in 1985.170 Without the political
commitment to structural change, there was a lack of economic growth and a large
increase in inflation, which lead to additional economic problems in 1985. At this point,
the government was unable to meet the IMF’s performance criteria, which resulted in the
suspension of further loan credits.171 The government then “had no choice but to take the
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medicine and to suffer the political consequences’ of additional reform. This resulted in
another round of “state divestitures, the replacement of import licenses by tariffs, the
elimination of quantitative controls on imports, and the withdrawal of many subsidies.”172
While Mexico eventually recovered in 1989, it was not a great decade overall, especially
for inequality, which rose from 46.3 in 1984 to 55.1 in 1989 based on the GINI
coefficient.173 The case of Mexico in the 1980s demonstrated how negotiations between
the IMF and the borrowing country and internal politics play an incredibly large role in
the conditions and implementation of IMF loans. These decisions help those in power,
while hurting the poor and middle classes and increasing income inequality.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
Following the Third World Debt Crisis in 1982, the number of IMF conditions
attached to its loans vastly increased, yet Latin America still suffered a series of further
crisis throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s. These countries were hurt by
unsustainable government policies, increased openness to global trade and capital flows
and a low rate of compliance with IMF conditions. This low rate of compliance and the
clear failures of increased conditionality led to a push for streamlining conditionality in
the beginning of the 2000s. By reducing the number of conditions, the IMF felt that it
would allow countries to increase the ownership of addressing their balance of payments
problems, thus increasing the level of compliance with the conditions that were deemed
essential to the success of the program.174
The high amount of conditions were also criticized because they imposed external
pressure to force a country to implement changes, and therefore, infringing upon the
country’s sovereignty. However, this hypothesis seems questionable when only the elites
and politicians determine how the country will implement these changes. These decisions
made in the realm of internal politics often focus on maintaining the current level of
power, and thus the brunt of the reforms falls on the poor, and less politically influential
groups. It would therefore be more appropriate to deem conditionality as a restriction on
the elites to decide whether or not to benefit themselves or the country as a whole.
While this may not always be the case, it is important to understand that
conditions do not necessarily have to be a negative action. If politicians and elites are
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able to enact the necessary reforms and ensure a fair distribution of burden to fix the
economy, then there is no need for IMF conditions.175 However, if the government
determines that staying in power is more important than these other factors, conditions
are required to force them to comply. This provides an interesting complexity to IMF
lending and conditionality, especially regarding the buy-in of the governments for certain
reforms, because the entire point of conditions is to force the governments to do
something that they would not do on their own without the condition. Therefore, the
underlying problem was not that there were too many conditions (assuming that the IMF
had determined conditions that would have been beneficial to the country), but that the
governments were simply not choosing to follow through with the conditions they had
originally agreed to. This low rate of compliance was for two reasons: a lack of
incentives from the IMF, and internal politics.
Streamlining conditionality was a clear indicator that the IMF recognized the high
levels of conditionality had not helped to fix the problem, and was trying to encourage
more countries to lend from them under less restricted terms. This demonstrates that
while the IMF wants to ensure that financial crises are solved in the most efficient
manner possible, the institution as a whole wants to give out loans. Otherwise, the
institution would have no purpose whatsoever. While it seems intuitive that the IMF
should want to give loans, it is actually an underlying problem that affects the success of
their programs. By caring about giving out a loan for the sake of distributing money whether or not this motivation is in addition to a demonstrated need – the IMF
undermines its bargaining power with the countries it is negotiating with. Conditionality
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is the way that the IMF tries to ensure that the government implements beneficial
economic policies, but without strict consequences for failing to meet conditionality
benchmarks, the governments of borrowing countries have very little incentive to actually
follow through with their agreements. Governments of borrowing countries are very
calculating and they understand that the IMF will simply renegotiate their loans if they
fail to meet set criteria. This allows them to implement policies that are most beneficial to
themselves, and their political support base, regardless of whether or not it is in line with
IMF conditions, or is beneficial for the country as a whole. Therefore, it is important to
understand that these governments are not helpless, but rather have significant leverage
and power when working with the IMF and determining the implementation of their
policies.176
Governments of borrowing countries have a significant amount of power over
determining how IMF loan conditions will be implemented, and therefore the role of
internal politics is extremely important as well. After accepting an IMF loan, the
government then has to determine how it is going to implement reforms while attempting
to navigate through all of the various interest groups, political opposition, and the citizens
of the country. The most probable scenario is that political “elites are reluctant to make
policy alternations that threaten their constituencies” and could harm their chances of
staying in power. For this same reason, “politicians prefer to proceed incrementally
because they fear that they will have to take on many groups at once.”177 Given the
176
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intense pressures that these governments face because of the fact that they are in an
economic crisis and are losing some sovereignty to an external organization, it makes
perfect sense that these decisions are based around political support more than economic
benefits. This also illustrates why governments so often do not implement, or only
partially implement adjusts required by IMF loan conditions.178 By delaying
implementation, the government gets to benefit in the short run by continuing providing
services for the people, but at the expense of the long term growth and equality in the
long run. However, if the government does have to implement reforms, they will make
sure that they protect the powerful elites to ensure political support. While there is such a
strong fear of losing power, interestingly enough, regime collapses and “large-scale and
persistent instability” are rarely ever caused by “the acceptance and implementation of
IMF policies.”179 While these factors are highly influential, it is very difficult to
“understand fully how such political factors might alter the effects of the IMF” and its
programs on income inequality and poverty.180
As the IMF has implemented the more streamlined conditionality, they have
attempted to increase the borrowing country’s ownership of the reforms, and therefore
make the changes necessary to fix their balance of payments disequilibria and foster
growth. However, there are still other underlying factors that must still be addressed in
order to improve the IMF conditionality outcomes on income inequality. Two important
factors are the lack of time to produce the most efficient programs in crisis situations, and
the concreteness of the IMF’s role as a financial only institution.
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During, or right before, an economic crisis of any magnitude, there is an obvious
sense of urgency to fix the problem as soon as possible. With such a high degree of
urgency it is impossible to fully think through the problem, and come up with the most
appropriate solution for the country’s economic wellbeing, let alone ensuring that income
inequality does not rise significantly and the poor are not disproportionately hurt during
this process. This sense of urgency occurred in the 1982 Mexican case, and the ultimate
product was a hastily put together program that did not address many crucial elements to
the reform of the Mexican economy Income inequality rose, and the poor were hurt
because of it. One might argue that the IMF learns from every past crisis, and is therefore
better equipped to make faster decisions, but in reality every crisis has its own unique set
of circumstances that make it different from previous crises.
Given that the IMF is a “’monetary not a development institution’” the priority
will always remain in fixing the country’s balance of payment problems.181 Ensuring that
that income inequality and poverty do not significantly rise in the country will be a very
difficult challenge during these crisis situations, unless the IMF takes a stronger stance on
ensuring these factors become a part of their policy packages. This is remains highly
unlikely despite the potential impacts that the IMF could have by focusing on a combined
effort to fix balance of payments problems, and ensure that inequality and poverty do not
disproportionately rise during this time.
Despite these challenges, the IMF has viable options that can not only improve
the success rate of its loans, but also ensure that inequality and poverty are not severely
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hurt in the process. One of these ways is by adding conditions to loans that restrict the
reductions in certain sectors that would disproportionately hurt the poor. While the IMF
would surely have an incredibly difficult time trying to force governments to place a
higher level of burden on the elites, they may be successful in at least ensuring the
poorest are still provided for. The IMF has recently implemented a number of loan
facilities aimed at reducing poverty, including the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF). There have also been studies that have shown countries under the ESAF
programs “have a more ‘pro-poor’ mix of stabilization policies and greater ‘social
capacity.’” Additionally, “government expenditure on health and education seems to be
more protected and regressive tax policies less likely.”182 Despite not being a
development agency, the IMF does have the ability to create positive impacts during its
programs.
The IMF would also benefit from taking a longer term view on growth and
income inequality, despite the immediate and daunting tasks they face during periods of
crisis. Similarly to capital expenditures, income inequality and poverty may be easy to
put aside and ignore and in the short run, but will have huge long term impacts on the
country and its economic growth. Governments understand the value of these longer term
investments, but they also tend to be the most politically appealing areas to reduce due to
the fact that the majority of the consequences will not be apparent until later in the future
when they are out of office. While addressing poverty and inequality in the short run may

182

Bird, Growth, Poverty, and the IMF, 629.

55

be costly, the costs could be much higher for the country in the forms of reduced growth
and distribution social tension.183
There are two ways in which the IMF could help improve income inequality and
poverty during its programs: 1) strict conditions that force governments to address these
issues and 2) utilizing foreign aid and the World Bank to cover short term budget cuts to
social services. Throughout this paper the inadequacies of conditionality have been
expressed, and therefore it is unlikely that conditions regarding income inequality and
poverty will be any more effective than the governments would do themselves. The
second option is more intriguing. The argument, posed by Bird, is that income inequality
and poverty increase during IMF programs due to the fact that governments184 cater to the
elite and thus disproportionately hurt the poor during the implementation of reforms.
Given that governments will be highly unlikely to change this self-serving manner of
business, the IMF could attract foreign aid, from the World Bank or other development
agencies, to supplement its loan with aid. This would “fill budgetary gaps” and cushion
“living standards against a decline in output” and thus ensure the poor do not become
worse off during this period of time. While this would require the approval of the
borrowing country, this seems to be the most viable option for taking a holistic approach
to fixing a country’s balance of payments problems, and ensuring the wellbeing of the
people.
The high levels of inequality in Latin America, the ever increasing global
financial integration, and the current economic volatility in Europe, pose serious threats
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for Latin America as a region despite its recent successes. The past decades and
numerous IMF loan programs have failed to address income inequality and poverty, but
have finally managed to get their economies on track. It is essential for the future
prosperity of the region that the IMF make these crucial reforms before the next crisis
emerges in Latin America. By addressing income inequality and poverty, in addition to
the balance of payments problems, the IMF will be able to not only fix the crisis, but
invest in the future growth of the country, and the region.

57

REFERENCES
Abed, George. Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries; Experience Under IMFSupported Programs. Vol. 160. Occasional Paper. Washington D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, 1998.
"About the IMF: History: Cooperation and Reconstruction (1944–71)." IMF -International Monetary Fund Home Page. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/about/histcoop.htm.
"About the IMF: History: The End of the Bretton Woods System (1972–81)." IMF -International Monetary Fund Home Page. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/about/histend.htm.
Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and
Investment." European Economic Review 40, no. 6 (1996): 1203-228.
doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00030-5.
Ball, Laurence, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash Loungani. "Finance & Development,
September 2011 - Painful Medicine." IMF -- International Monetary Fund Home
Page. September 2011. Accessed November 27, 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/Ball.htm.
Berg, Andrew, and Jeffrey Sachs. The Debt Crisis: Structural Explanations of Country
Performance. Vol. 2607. Working Paper. National Bureau of Economic Reserach,
1988.
Bienen, Henry, and Mark Gersovitz. "Economic Stabilization, Conditionality, and
Political Stability." International Organization 39, no. 4 (Fall 1985): 729-54.
Accessed November 27, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706721.
Bird, Graham, and Paul Mosley. "Should the IMF Discontinue Its Long-term Lending
Role in Developing Countries?" In Globalization and the Nation State: the Impact
of the IMF and the World Bank, edited by Gustav Ranis, James Raymond
Vreeland, and Stephen Kosack. London: Routledge, 2006. Accessed November
26, 2011.
Bird, Graham. "Growth, Poverty and the IMF." Journal of International Development 16,
no. 4 (2004): 621-36. doi:10.1002/jid.1111.
Bird, Graham. "Reforming IMF Conditionality - From 'streamlining' to 'major Overhaul'"
World Economics 10, no. 3 (September 2009): 81-104. Accessed November 26,
2011. http://www.relooney.info/0_New_5922.pdf.
Bird, Graham. "The IMF: A Bird's Eye View Of Its Role And Operations." Journal of
58

Economic Surveys 21, no. 4 (2007): 683-745.
Bléjer, Mario I., and Ke-young Chu. Fiscal Policy, Stabilization, and Growth in
Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1989.
Boughton, James. "From Suez to Tequila: The IMF as a Crisis Manager." The Economic
Journal 11-, no. 460 (January 2000): 273-91. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2565658.
Boughton, James M. "7. The Mexican Crisis: No Mountain Too High?" In Silent
Revolution: the International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989, 281-318. Washington,
D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2001.
Boughton, James. "The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas That
Have Shaped the Institution." IDEAS: Economics and Finance Research.
Accessed November 26, 2011. http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/04-75.html.
Buira, Ariel. An Analysis of IMF Conditionality. University of Oxford, Department of
Economics, 2002.
Clements, Benedict. Income Distribution and Social Expenditure in Brazil. IMF Working
Paper. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997.
Cornelius, Wayne A. "The Political Economy of Mexico under De La Madrid: Austerity,
Routinized Crisis, and Nascent Recovery." Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos
1, no. 1 (1985): 83-124. doi:10.1525/msem.1985.1.1.03a00040.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, Jose Vinals, and Richard Portes. "Mexico: Stabilization, Debt and
Growth." Economic Policy 3, no. 7 (October 1988): 231-83. Accessed November
26, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344488 .
Dreher, Axel. "Does the IMF Influence Fiscal and Monetary Policy?" The Journal of
Policy Reform 8, no. 3 (2005): 225-38. doi:10.1080/13841280500181726.
Easterly, William. "The Effect of IMF and World Bank Programs on Poverty." October
31, 2000. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-00/e.pdf.
Fund-Supported Programs, Fiscal Policy, and Income Distribution. Vol. 46. Occasional
Paper. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1986.
Garuda, Gopal. "The Distributional Effects of IMF Programs: A Cross-Country
Analysis." World Development 28, no. 6 (2000): 1031-051.
Ghai, Dharam P. The IMF and the South: the Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment.
59

London: Zed Books on Behalf of UNRISD, Geneva [and] ISER/UWI, Kingston,
1991.
Goñi, Edwin, J. Humberto López, and Luis Servén. "Fiscal Redistribution and Income
Inequality in Latin America." World Development 39, no. 9 (2011): 1558-569.
Heller, Peter, et al. The Implications of Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs for
Poverty; Experiences in Selected Countries. Vol. 58. Occasional Paper.
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1988.
Hoffman, Kelly, and Miguel Centeno. "The Lopsided Continent: Inequality in Latin
America." Annual Review of Sociology 29 (2003): 363-90. Accessed November
26, 2011. www.jstor.org/stable/30036972.
Hutchison, M. "Macroeconomic Effects of IMF-sponsored Programs in Latin America:
Output Costs, Program Recidivism and the Vicious Cycle of Failed
Stabilizations." Journal of International Money and Finance 22, no. 7 (2003):
991-1014.
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). Fiscal Adjustment in IMF-Supported Programs.
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2003.
International Monetary Fund Handbook - Its Functions, Policies, and Operations. Edited
by Bernhand Fritz-Krockow and Parmeshwar Ramlogan. Washington D.C.:
International Monetary Fund, 2007. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/imfhb/eng/handbook.pdf.
Johnson, Omotunde, and Joanne Salop. "Distributional Aspects of Stabilization Programs
in Developing Countries." Palgrave Macmillan 27, no. 1 (March 1980): 1-23.
Accessed November 26, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3866860.
Kaufman, Robert R. "The Politics of Economic Adjustment Policy in Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico: Experiences in the 1980s and Challenges for the Future." Policy
Sciences 22, no. 3-4 (1989): 395-413. doi:10.1007/BF00136325.
Killick, Tony. "Structural Adjustment and Poverty Alleviation: An Interpretative
Survey." Development and Change 26, no. 2 (1995): 305-30. doi:10.1111/j.14677660.1995.tb00554.x.
Krugman, Paul R., Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc J. Melitz. International Economics:
Theory & Policy. Boston: Pearson Addison-Wesley, 2012.
Lustig, Nora. "Economic Crisis, Adjustment and Living Standards in Mexico, 1982-85."
World Development 18, no. 10 (1990): 1325-342. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v18y1990i10p1325-1342.html.
60

Mackenzie, G.A., David Orsmond, and Philip Gerson. The Composition of Fiscal
Adjustment and Growth: Lessons from Fiscal Reforms in Eight Economies. Vol.
149. Occasional Paper. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997.
Nooruddin, Irfan, and Joel W. Simmons. "The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs
and Government Spending." International Organization 60, no. 04 (2006).
Pastor, Manuel, and Gary A. Dymski. "Debt Crisis and Class Conflict in Latin America."
Capital & Class 15, no. 1 (1991): 203-31.
Pastor, Manuel. "The Effects of IMF Programs in the Third World: Debate and Evidence
from Latin America." IDEAS: Economics and Finance Research. 1987. Accessed
November 27, 2011. http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v15y1987i2p249262.html.
Pastor, Manuel. The International Monetary Fund and Latin America: Economic
Stabilization and Class Conflict. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.
Polak, J. J. The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality. Princeton, NJ: International
Finance Section, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, 1991.
Roett, Riordan. The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996.
Sisson, Charles. "Fund-supported Programs and Income Distribution in LDCs." Finance
and Development, March 1986, 33-36.
Taylor, Lance. The Rocky Road to Reform: Adjustment, Income Distribution, and Growth
in the Developing World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993.
Teichman, Judith. "Mexico and Argentina: Economic Reform and Technocratic Decision
Making." Studies in Comparative International Development 32, no. 1 (1997): 3155. doi:10.1007/BF02696305.
Ter-Minassian, Teresa, and Gerd Schwartz. The Role of Fiscal Policy in Sustainable
Stabilization: Evidence from Latin America. August 1997. Accessed November
26, 2011. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9794.pdf.
Todaro, Michael P., and Stephen C. Smith. Economic Development. Boston: Pearson
Addison Wesley, 2006.
Vreeland, James Raymond. The IMF and Economic Development. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.

61

Vreeland, James. "The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor." World Development 30, no. 1
(2002): 121-39. Accessed November 26, 2011.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.29.3746.
World Bank Development Research Group. Mexico GINI Coefficient Data. 2011. Raw
data. Washington D.C.

62

